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COMMENT
The Virginia Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act
After Edgar v. Mite Corp.
By Bradford J. Shafer*
Introduction
The use of the tender offer 1 as a means of acquiring corporate con-
trol was unregulated by both the states and the federal government prior
to 1968. Virginia was the first state to regulate these practices,2 and the
federal government followed four months later with the passage of the
Williams Act.3 Subsequently, thirty-seven additional states enacted simi-
lar takeover legislation.4 The constitutionality of these state statutes has
* B.A., 1981, University of the Pacific; member, third year class.
1. "Tender offer" has been defined as
[a]n offer to purchase shares made by one company direct to the stockholders of
another company, sometimes subject to a minimum and/or maximum that the of-
feror will accept, communicated to the shareholders by means of newspaper adver-
tisements and (if the offeror can obtain the shareholders list, which is not often unless
it is a friendly tender) by a general mailing to the entire list of shareholders, with a
view to acquiring control of the second company.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (5th ed. 1979). The terms "takeover bid" and "tender offer"
are synonymous and are used interchangeably. Although left undefined by Congress, the term
"tender offer" has been described by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) as a request
or invitation for tenders and means "one or more offers to purchase, or solicitations of offers to
sell, securities of a single class... ." Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, SEC Act
Release No. 6159, Exchange Act Release No. 16385 [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) para. 82,374. See also E. ARANow & H. En'HoRN, TENDER OFFERS FOR COR-
PORATE CONTROL 70 (1973).
2. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -540 (1984) (effective March 5, 1968).
3. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1981)). The Williams Act became effective on July 29, 1968. It added sections 13(d)-(e)
and 14(d)-(f) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. For the Act's legislative history, see Hear-
ings on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); Hearings on S. 510
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
4. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -.14
(Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11.51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 36-456 to -468 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 517.35-.363 (West Supp. 1978) (repealed by 1979 FLA. LAWS 381 § 13); GA. CODE
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
been questioned by commentators5 and has been flatly denied by many
courts.6
ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (Supp. 1983);
IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501, 03, 05, 07, 08 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121 1/2, §§ 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84) (repealed by P.A. 83-365, § 1, eff. Sept. 14,
1983); IND. CODE §§ 23-2-3.1 to -.11 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.102, .211-.215 (West
Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (Supp. 1983); Ky. REv. STAT.
§§ 292.560-.991 (Supp. 1982) (repealed 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West
Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (Supp. 1983-84); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C, §§ 1-13 (West
Supp. 1984-85); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.902-917 (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp.
1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2418
to -2430 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-
A:1-:15 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -19 (West Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 1600-14 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (Supp.
1984); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§§ 415-450 (West Supp. 1983-84); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-10 to -130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 47-32-1 to -47 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (Supp. 1983); Tex. Adminis-
trative Guidelines for Minimum Standards in Tender Offers §§ 065.15.00.100-.800, reprinted
in [1979] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) paras. 55, 671-55, 682; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -
13 (1978) (repealed by 1983 UTAH LAWS ch. 335, § 3); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-25 (West
Special Pamphlet 1983).
For a list of statutes that have been held unconstitutional, see infra note 6.
5. See, e.& Aranow & Einhom, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 767 (1971); Langevoort, State Tender Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Polit-
ical Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State
Takeover Statutues and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976); Comment,
State Regulation of Tender Offers: How Much is Constitutional?, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 656
(1981); Note, State Takeover Statutes Under Attack-Casualties in the Battle for Corporate
Control-MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DE PAUL L. REv. 989 (1981); Note, State Regulation of
Tender Offers for Insurance Companies After Edgar v. MITE, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 943
(1983); Note, Corporate Battles for Control-Edgar v. MITE and the Constitutionality of State
Takeover Legislation-The Continuing Saga, 26 How. L.J. 1425 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Corporate Battles for Control]; Comment, Challenges to State Takeover Laws: Preemption and
the Commerce Clause, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 657 (1981); Note, The Validity of State Tender Offer
Statutes: SEC Rule 14d-2(b) and Post-Kidwell Federal Decisions, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1025 (1981). But cf. Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoreti-
cal Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 733 (1979).
6. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri);
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on grounds of
improper venue sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho);
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) S
98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981) (Oklahoma); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D.
Nev. 1981) (Nevada); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania);
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981) (New Jersey); Canadian Pacific
Enterprises, Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Ohio); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc.
v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) t 97,805 (D. Conn. Dec. 16,
1980) (Connecticut); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 97,804 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (South Carolina); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,247 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 1979) (Louisi-
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In 1982 the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.7 It held that Illinois' takeover statute was an unconstitu-
tional burden upon interstate commerce.8 Armed with this holding and
the rationale behind it, tender offerors will be attacking these statutes
with greater frequency and greater success in the future.9
ana); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware); Esmark, Inc. v.
Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky); Kelly ex rel McLaughlin v. Beta-X Corp.
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,897 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1981)
(Michigan); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,694 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 1980) (North Carolina). Contra Cardiff Acquisitions,
Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (Minnesota); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F.
Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. 1980); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 433 A.2d 1250 (N.H. 1981) (New Hampshire) (vacated and remanded
for consideration in light of Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)).
While numerous statutes have been held unconstitutional by federal district courts, most
remain in force. See supra note 4. Decisions by federal district courts and circuit courts of
appeals "owe no obedience to the decisions of their counterparts in other districts, nor to the
decisions of the courts of appeals in other circuits." lB J. MOORE, J. LucAs & T. CURRIER,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402 [1] (2d ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). Thus, state legis-
lation may remain in force until that state's highest court, or the United States Supreme Court,
finds it unconstitutional. See, eg., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425,
1431 (10th Cir. 1983), and Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) S 96,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981) (both striking down Oklahoma Act).
Five of the statutes listed above (Del., Idaho, La., Mich., and Nev.) were held unconstitu-
tional based on a traditional Supremacy Clause preemption analysis. See infra note 46. The
laws were found to obstruct "the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress" as outlined in the Williams Act. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
526 (1977) (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
However, seven statutes (Conn., Mo., N.J., N.C., Ohio, Pa., and S.C.) were specifically
preempted by the recent SEC Rule 14d-2(b). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(1980). This rule sets
up a direct conflict between the Williams Act and state takeover laws by requiring an offeror to
commence or withdraw its offer within five business days of any public announcement regard-
ing the offer's material terms. Most state takeover acts demand pre-offer announcements that
contain information which will trigger Rule 14d-2(b). See, eg., VA. CODE § 13.1-531 (1984).
When the state law pre-offer waiting period exceeds five days and the announcement has trig-
gered Rule 14d-2(b), federal law requires an offeror to act before the state law permits such
action. Since compliance with both federal and state law becomes impossible, preemption is
found.
Arguably, the Virginia Act discussed in this Comment would also be preempted by 14d-
2(b) under the rationale outlined above. But cf. Note, Kneeling to the SEC Rules: The Vir-
ginia Takeover Act and SEC Rule 14d-2(b), 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 487 (1981).
7. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
8. Id. at 646. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have power
• . . to regulate commerce. . . among the several States. .. ." Although SEC Rule 14d-
2(b), discussed supra note 6, has been used to strike down state takeover laws, it was not in
effect at the time of MITE's initial tender offer. Therefore, it was not an issue before the
Court. This Comment examines the constitutionality of the Virginia Act under the Commerce
Clause analysis actually used in MITE.
9. At least two circuit courts and one state supreme court have used MITE to strike
down state takeover legislation. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425,
1431 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma Act invalid after MITE); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC
Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Act invalid after MITE); Esmark, Inc. v.
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This Comment will examine the very first state takeover statute, Vir-
ginia's Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act,10 ("Virginia Act") to determine
whether it meets the Commerce Clause requirements identified in MITE.
First, the pertinent provisions of the Williams Act and the original Vir-
ginia Act will be outlined. A discussion of the changes in the Virginia
Act prior to MITE will follow. Next, the MITE Court's Commerce
Clause analysis of the similar Illinois statute will be discussed. Finally,
the Virginia Act will be scrutinized to determine whether it meets the
MITE requirements.
I. The Williams Act
As the cash tender offer gained popularity as a means to acquire
corporate control in the late 1960's, concern mounted over the lack of
adequate investor information disclosed by the offeror. Congress re-
sponded with the Williams Act," an amendment to the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act.
The thrust of the Williams Act-full and fair disclosure for the pro-
tection of investors 12 -is clearly evident from its general provisions. For
Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky Act invalid after MITE). But see Cardiff
Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding Minnesota Act against
both preemption and Commerce Clause challenges after MITE).
Other courts have recognized that MITE undermines the validity of state takeover stat-
utes previously considered constitutional. See, e.g., Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686
F.2d 1029, 1040 (1st Cit. 1982) (upholding Massachusetts Act against preemption challenge,
but remanding for consideration of Act's effects on interstate commerce in light of MITE);
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 1982) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction against enforcement of Michigan Act because petitioners showed a likelihood
of success on the merits in proving the Michigan Act unconstitutional after MITE).
10. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -540 (1984) (effective Mar. 5, 1968).
11. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-
(f) (1981)).
Although Congress gave primary enforcement authority of the Williams Act to the SEC,
lower courts have interpreted the Act to allow private actions for both damages and injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus. v. Great Adt. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 699 (2d Cir.
1973) (injunction); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aft'd, 682
F.2d 355 (2nd Cir. 1982) (injunction); In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp. Sec.
Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 241-43 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (damages); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1368-69 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (damages). See also Note, Securities
Law: Implied Causes ofAction Under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 66 MINN. L. REv. 865
(1982). But see Comment, An Implied Private Right of Action Under the Williams Act: Tradi-
tion vs. Economic Reality, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 316 (1982) (recommending that courts not imply
a private cause of action under the Williams Act for incumbent management against a tender
offeror).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1968).
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example, any person1 3 who acquires beneficial ownership of five percent
or more of any registered equity security 4 must disclose detailed infor-
mation" to the issuer, the SEC, and all the exchanges upon which the
security is traded.
This information includes: the background and identity of the pur-
chaser; 6 the source and amount of funds or other consideration used in
making the purchase;" whether the purchaser plans to acquire control of
the issuer and, if so, what major changes it contemplates making if this
control is obtained;18 and any information regarding contracts, arrange-
ments, or understandings with other persons respecting the issuer's
securities.1 9
The Williams Act also contains additional requirements designed to
protect investors in the target company.20 For instance, if an offeree-
investor deposits his securities pursuant to the tender offer, he may with-
draw them at any time up to seven days or after sixty days from the first
published invitation, as long as they have not been purchased by the of-
feror.21 If the offer is for a number of shares less than the total shares
outstanding of a particular class, but more than that number are ten-
dered within ten days of the initial offer, the offeror is bound to buy the
additional shares pro rata (according to the number deposited by each
offeree).2 2 Finally, if the offeror increases the consideration it will pay for
shares after some security holders have tendered, the offeror must pay
that increased premium to all the tenderors.2 3
13. "Person" is defined as "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a
joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organization." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-1(b) (1983).
14. A "registered equity security" for purposes of the Williams Act is the equity security
of any company with assets exceeding $1,000,000 and 500 or more stockholders of record. 15
U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B) (Supp. 1983). The $1,000,000 figure was changed to $3,000,000 by rule.
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-I (1983) (effective Apr. 21, 1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1983).
16. Id. § 78m(d)(1)A.
17. Id. § 78m(d)(1)B.
18. Id. § 78m(d)(1)C.
19. Id. § 78m(d)(1)E. This section of the Act allows the SEC to permit a person to file a
"bare" statement, if it finds that "such securities were acquired by such person in the ordinary
course of his business and were not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the effect of
changing or influencing the control of the issuer .. " Id. § 78m(d)(5). A "bare statement"
lists only the purchaser's name and the number of shares acquired, rather than the detailed
information set forth in the text. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
21. Id. § 78n(d)(5). The seven day period was extended by SEC rule to 15 business days.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1983) (effective Dec. 6, 1979). This provision permits offerees to
withdraw their tendered shares without penalty if the shares have not been purchased by the
offeror.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6). This provision ensures that shareholders who wait a short
period of time before tendering will not be completely excluded from the offer.
23. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
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II. The Virginia Act
As noted earlier, the state of Virginia was the first governmental
entity to regulate tender offers. z4 Like the Williams Act, Virginia's Take-
Over-Bid Disclosure Act25 is designed to require "fair, full and effective
disclosure to offerees of all information material to a decision to accept or
reject a take-over bid."' 26 Unlike the Williams Act, however, the Virginia
Act compels this disclosure prior to the tender invitation rather than si-
multaneous with it.
27
As originally passed in 1968, the Virginia Act provided extensive
protection to shareholders in target corporations that were both incorpo-
rated and doing business in the state.28 A tender offeror had to provide a
"deposit time period" of at least twenty-one days and not more than
thirty-five days from the date of the initial invitation for shareholders to
deposit their shares.29 Once deposited, the shares could be withdrawn by
the tenderor at any time within twenty-one days of the initial
invitation.30
The disclosure/hearing section of the Virginia Act afforded more
substantive protection.3" It prevented a tender offer from proceeding un-
less the offeror filed a detailed statement with the State Corporation
Commission (SCC) at least twenty days prior to the public invitation.
This statement required much of the same information that the Williams
Act called for, including: the identity and business background of the
purchaser; the source and amount of the tender consideration; the of-
feror's plans if control was obtained through the offer; and the details of
any contracts, arrangements, or understandings respecting the offeree
company's securities.32 The Virginia Act also demanded an exhaustive
description of the offeror's business activities, pending legal disputes,
property holdings, capital structure, and officer and director
24. See supra text accompanying note 2.
25. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -540 (1984).
26. Id. § 13.1-528. The purpose of the Virginia Act is to "protect the interests of offerees,
investors, and the public. ... Id.
27. Id. § 13.1-531. See also Legislative Developments, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 749, 750
(1978).
Another difference between the Virginia Act and the Williams Act is their enforcement
methods. The Virginia Act specifically provides for a private cause of action. VA. CODE
§ 13.1-535 to -39 (1984). Although several courts have implied a private cause of action under
the Williams Act, it contains no specific provision. See supra note 11.
28. VA. CODE § 13.1-529(e) (1978).
29. Id. § 13.1-530(a).
30. Id. § 13.1-530(b). This subsection of the Virginia Act also has two provisions that are
similar to sections 78n(d)(6) and (7) of the Williams Act. See id. § 13.1-530(c) to (d); see supra
text accompanying notes 22-23.
31. VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)-(d).
32. Id. § 13.1-531(b)(i),(iii),(iv),(vi). For a discussion of similar provisions in the Wil-
liams Act, see supra text accompanying notes 16-23.
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qualifications.3
Even if an offeror satisfied all of these requirements, the offer could
still be stalled by the Act's hearing provisons.34 Within ten days of the
offeror's filing, the SCC could order a hearing to adjudicate the fairness
and effectiveness of the proposed disclosure.35 The offeree company
could also request a hearing within the same ten day period, although the
decision to call the hearing remained at the SCC's discretion.31 If a hear-
ing were ordered, it could commence anytime within forty days of the
offeror's original filing.3v The SCC had to rule on the propriety of the
disclosure "within twenty-five days of the conclusion of the hearing and
the filing of the post-hearing briefs."
38
MI. Changes in the Virginia Act Prior to Edgar v. MITE
The preceding outlines of the Virginia Act and Williams Act indi-
cate that Virginia originally went beyond the federal government in the
effort to protect shareholders of target corporations. Not only was dis-
closure required before the offer, but the detail of the disclosure was sub-
stantially more exhaustive.39 Also, Virginia provided for review of the
disclosure by means of a hearing, a procedure notably absent from the
federal law.
Virginia's extensive provisions were typical of state tender offer
statutes." Many of these new state laws took effect in the early 1970's,
and before long they came under heavy attack. Often, the challenges
33. The pertinent provision required:
[c]omplete information on the organization and operations of offeror, including with-
out limitation the year of organization, form of organization, jurisdiction in which it
is organized, a description of each class of the offeror's capital stock and of its long-
term debt, financial statements for the current period and for the three most recent
annual accounting periods, a brief description of the location and general character
of the principal physical properties of the offeror and its subsidiaries, a description of
pending legal proceedings other than routine litigation to which the offeror or any of
its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the subject, a brief
description of the business done and projected by the offeror and its subsidiaries and
the general development of such business over the past five years, the names of all
directors and executive officers together with biographical summaries of each for the
preceeding five years to date, and the approximate amount of any material interest,
direct or indirect, of any of the directors or officers in any material transaction during
the past three years, or in any proposed material transactions to which the offeror or
any of its subsidiaries was or is to be a party.
VA. CODE § 13.1-531(b)(vii) (1978).
34. Id. § 13.1-531(a)(i),(ii),(iii); § 13.1-534(b).
35. Id. § 13.1-531(a)(iii).
36. Id. § 13.1-531(a)(ii).
37. Id. § 13.1-534(b).
38. Id.
39. See supra text accompanying note 33.
40. See, eg., HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -11 (Supp. 1976). For a list of state take-
over legislation, see supra note 4.
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were based on federal preemption via the Supremacy Clause,41 and less
frequently on violations of the Commerce Clause.42 The first major casu-
alty was the Idaho takeover statute. In Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,43 the Fifth Circuit held the legislation invalid on both preemp-
tion and Commerce Clause grounds. In analyzing the preemption issue,
the Kidwell court determined that Congress intended the Williams Act to
provide neutral regulation that favored neither a target nor an offeror.
44
Because the Idaho Act required advance disclosures and potential pre-
offer hearings, it "favored" the target at the expense of the offeror.41 The
Fifth Circiit viewed this favoritism as contrary to congressional intent
and detrimental to congressional objectives.4" Hence, the statute was
preempted.
In its Commerce Clause analysis, the Kidwell court utilized a test set
forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.47 In Pike, a unanimous Supreme
Court outlined criteria for determining the constitutionality of state stat-
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "The supremacy clause mandates that federal law over-
rides, i.e. preempts, any state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets
of legislation such that both cannot stand, for example, if federal law forbids an act which state
legislation requires." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d
ed. 1983). See infra note 46 (discussing traditional Supremacy Clause preemption analysis).
42. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), discussed infra at notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
Historically, Commerce Clause analysis has permitted states to legislate for the protection
of their citizens as a function of their police powers. "In the exercise of [their police] power,
the states and their instrumentalities may act, in many areas of interstate commerce.. . con-
currently with the federal government." Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
442 (1960) (citing, inter alia, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913)).
But "[t]he basic limitations upon local legislative power in [the Commerce Clause] area are
clear enough. . . . Evenhanded local regulation. . is valid unless. .. unduly burdensome
on. . .interstate commerce. Id. at 443 (citing, inter alia, Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959)).
Commerce Clause challenges to state tender offer legislation contend that the laws reach
beyond the legitimate exercise of local police power and unduly burden interstate commerce.
See infra notes 47-49, 63-73 and accompanying text.
43. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on grounds of improper venue sub norm Leroy v.
Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
44. 577 F.2d at 1276-81. This neutrality was referred to as a "market approach". Id. at
1276.
45. For a discussion of how hearing provisions favor target corporations at the expense of
offerors, see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
46. The traditional standard followed in preemption cases "is 'to determine whether,
under the circumstances of [the] particular case, [the State's] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1976) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)). Congress may specifically preempt a field of regulation by drafting a statutory provi-
sion that explicitly prohibits parallel state action. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed. 1983).
47. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Pike test was also used by the Court in MITE. See
infra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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utes that affect interstate commerce: "[When] the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits." 4
Applying this test to the Idaho Act, the Kidwell court found the
local public benefits of "encouraging good corporate citizenship" and
"protecting resident shareholders" insufficient to justify halting a multi-
million dollar interstate commerce transaction.49
In the wake of Kidwell, several other state takeover statutes were
held unconstitutional.50 The Virginia Legislature responded to these de-
cisions in 1979 by making minor changes in its takeover act. The legisla-
ture deleted the requirement fixing a time limit of not less than twenty-
one days from the first invitation for deposit of shares pursuant to a
tender offer.5 It also reduced the time allotted a depositing shareholder
to withdraw his shares from twenty-one days to seven days and permit-
ted withdrawal of any unpurchased shares after sixty days.52 Perhaps
most significantly, the exhaustive "personal" disclosure requirements
were repealed, 3 and SEC Schedule 14D-1 was permitted to substitute for
the general disclosure required by the Virginia Act.54 All of these
amendments made the Virginia Act more consistent with the require-
ments of the Williams Act.
It is important to note that the Virginia Legislature made only one
significant change in the hearing provisions of the Virginia Act: the re-
scission of the extensive personal disclosure subsection. Thus, the most
burdensome sections of the Virginia Act from a Commerce Clause stand-
point-the hearing provisions-are still in their original form.
48. 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960)).
49. 577 F.2d at 1282-86. Although the local public interest in "encouraging good corpo-
rate citizenship" was legitimate, the circuit court found no evidence indicating that it had more
than nominal weight. Id. at 1286. The local interest in "protecting resident shareholders" was
also legitimate, but was undercut since many of the target company's shareholders were non-
residents. Id. at 1283-85.
50. See supra note 6.
51. See supra text accompanying note 29.
52. VA. CODE § 13.1-531(b) (1984).
53. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
54. See supra text accompanying note 32. Not all of the amendments were designed to
prevent conflicts with federal law. A 1980 amendment to the Virginia Act required additional
disclosure if the offeror intended to change control of the target company. VA. CODE § 13.1-
529(b)(iii) (1981). This provision was declared unconstitutional as a violation of the Commerce
Clause in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 547 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1982), affd, 697 F.2d 576 (4th
Cir. 1983) and was subsequently deleted from the code by a 1983 amendment. See infra text
accompanying notes 79-84.
55. See supra note 33.
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IV. Edgar v. MITE Corp.
The Supreme Court finally addressed the constitutionality of a state
takeover statute in Edgar v. MITE Corp.5 6 The law at issue was Illinois'
Business Takeover Act57 which, although similar to the Virginia Act,
had some significantly broader provisions.58
In MITE, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Connecticut initiated a cash tender offer for all the outstanding
shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. MITE
complied with the Williams Act requirements but did not file the prelimi-
nary statements required by Illinois law. 59 Instead, it sought an injunc-
tion and a declaratory judgment from the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois that the state law was preempted by the
Williams Act and that the Illinois law violated the Commerce Clause.
The district court ruled in MITE's favor on both points. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed' ° and Illinois appealed.61 Writing for
a five to four majority,62 Justice White concluded that the Illinois law
was unconstitutional since it impermissably burdened interstate com-
merce.6" The Court applied the test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.64
56. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). It is interesting to note that the Virginia Attorney General filed
an amicus brief urging the Court to uphold the Illinois law. Id. at 626 n.*.
57. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137-.51-.70. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
58. For example, the Virginia Act applies only to corporations incorporated and doing
business in Virginia. VA. CODE § 13.1-529(e) (1984). The Illinois Act applied to any corpora-
tion if at least 10% of its shareholders were Illinois residents, or if any two of the following
three conditions existed:
(1) the corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois; (2) the corporation
was incorporated in Illinois; (3) the corporation had at least 10% of its stated capital
and paid-in surplus represented within the state.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, % 137.51-70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
Additionally, after a hearing in Illinois, a tender offer could be blocked merely if the state
believed the offer was substantively unfair. Id. at 1137.57 E (1979). The Virginia standard
prevents tender offers only if there has been "failure to provide full and fair disclosure." VA.
CODE § 13.1-531(a)('ii). See also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
59. Like Virginia, Illinois required pre-offer filings 20 days before a public invitation could
take effect. During this time a decision was made by the state whether or not to hold a hearing
on the proposed takeover. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.57 A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
60. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (1980).
61. 451 U.S. 968 (1981) (probable jurisdiction noted).
62. White wrote a five part opinion, but the majority embraced only three of the parts.
The actual majority opinion of the Court is comprised of sections I, II, and V-B of White's
decision. The latter part, section V-B, analyzed the statute under the Commerce Clause.
63. 457 U.S. at 646. Justice White also found that under the Supremacy Clause, the Wil-
liams Act preempted the Illinois law. Stressing Congress' intention to make tender offer regu-
lation neutral (benefitting neither offeror nor offeree management), he found that three
provisions of the Illinois law stood "as obstacles to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 634.
The objectionable provisions of the Illinois law were: (1) the 20 day pre-invitation notifi-
cation period; (2) the hearing provisions; and (3) the provision allowing Illinois to pass on the
substantive fairness of the offer. White believed that the first two provisions gave inordinate
Winter 1985) VIRGINIA TAKE-OVER-BID DISCLOSURE ACT 357
Under this test, state laws aimed at legitimate local interests are upheld
even when they affect interstate commerce unless the "burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." 65
Illinois argued that two local benefits justified the Act: (1) Illinois'
right to protect resident security holders; and (2) Illinois' interest in regu-
lating the internal affairs66 of companies incorporated under Illinois law.
The Court admitted that the first justification was "plainly a legitimate
state objective."67 However, it warned that no state has a legitimate in-
terest in protecting nonresident shareholders.68 The local interest in se-
time to the offeree's incumbent management. Since the target could use this time to formulate
defensive plans, these provisions favored the target at the expense of the offeror. The latter
provision permitted the state to supplant investors' substantive decisions regarding tender of-
fers. Id. at 635-40.
Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun accepted this preemption analysis.
64. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. If there is a legitimate local purpose for the
state regulation, then "the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities." Pike, 397
U.S. at 142.
The Pike test refined a "weighing and balancing of interests" test adopted in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). While the Southern Pacific Court weighed the
state's police power interest (in regulating train lengths) against the national interest (in eco-
nomic and efficient railway transportation services), the Pike Court clarified the weight that
each interest should be given. Under the Pike rule, state legislation may affect interstate com-
merce, but the burden it imposes cannot be "clearly excessive" in relation to the state's local
benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Courts have utilized the Southern Pacific test in Commerce Clause cases for the past 40
years. See, eg., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949). However, since the basic test involves a weighing and balancing of state
and national interests, the results of each challenge are fact specific. Consequently, there has
been some uncertainty and unpredictability in Commerce Clause cases. Compare Hunt v.
Washington State Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (striking down state law that
discriminated against out of state apple growers) and Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27 (1980) (striking down state law that prohibited investment advisory services
owned by out of state banks) with Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978)
(upholding state law that prohibited many out of state oil producers from operating local retail
service stations).
66. The states' interest in regulating the internal affairs of companies incorporated under
their laws has long been recognized. "Corporations owe their existence to state law and draw
all of their powers from it. The states are the source of law creating corporations organized in
them and the principal source of law creating the rights and duties of the corporation to its
shareholders and others." Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE, Stand-
ing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV. 3, 29 (1984) (citing, inter
alia, Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 1 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 167 (1804) and Roberts v. Northern
Pac. R.R., 158 U.S. 1, 24 (1885)).
67. 457 U.S. at 644.
68. Id. At this point, White challenged Illinois' assertion that the "legislative purpose" of
the act was protection of resident investors. He noted that the Illinois Act exempts a corn-
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curing adequate time and information for Illinois sharehold
examine the merits of a tender offer was already protected by th
liams Act; the extra disclosures required by Illinois law afforded;
only "speculative" additional protection.69 These factors indicatt
the "putative local benefit" was minimal.70
As for Illinois' second contention that the act regulated or
internal affairs of corporations organized under its laws, the Cou
missed this claim as being without foundation. Because the Illinc
applied to any corporation if ten percent of its outstanding share
held by Illinois residents, 7 the Act could apply to out of state cc
tions doing business in other states.72
In sum, neither of the reasons put forth by Illinois were subsi
Perhaps most importantly, the hearing provisions of the Act could
nationwide tender offer while Illinois adjudicated the fairness of tl
toward its resident shareholders. Thus the Court concluded that tl
den on interstate commerce was excessive when compared with th
benefits; indeed, "Illinois [had] the power to determine whether a
offer [could] proceed anywhere. ,
73
The MITE Commerce Clause analysis has been described a
simplistic"'74 because "[e]ven if state takeover laws can be demoni
shown to cause delay in the consumation of tender offers, the qi
should be whether such delay operates to the benefit or detrin
shareholders. That issue cannot be resolved in the abstract-it is
tially a factual question."
'75
pany's acquisition of its own shares from coverage. Id. Therefore, a target compa
make a "counter-tender offer" (technically referred to as an issuer-tender) for its o'
without complying with the Illinois Act. Id. White intimated that if the real purpo
Illinois Act was to protect resident investors, then issuer-tenders would not have
empted. Theoretically, investors are threatened by unfair nondisclosure in any ten
regardless of who makes it. Thus, the Illinois Act actually protected incumbent mar
rather than resident shareholders.
Unlike both the Illinois Act and the Virginia Act, the Williams Act does no
issuer-tenders. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-1 (1984).
69. 457 U.S. at 644-45. But see Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply
man Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231; Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State
Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722 (1970) (both co
tors criticize the Williams Act for not affording investors enough time to make a
decision).
70. 457 U.S. at 646.
71. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
72. 457 U.S. at 645. The Court also found another problem with the "interna
justification. Since tender offers "contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders t4
party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company," th
affairs justification is inapposite. Id.
73. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
74. Profusek & Gompf, supra note 66, at 18.
75. Id.
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It is clear that the MITE Court believed inordinate delay was detri-
mental to shareholders.76 The difficulty with the opinion is that the
Court applied a vague and subjective legal standard without articulating
its reasoning. The Pike test requires weighing and balancing legitimate
local interests against burdens on interstate commerce.77 Yet the MITE
Court never specifically indicated how much regulation was too much.
In other words, the Court never designated when otherwise legitimate
regulation became an excessive burden on interstate commerce.
V. The Constitutionality of the Virginia Act After Edgar v.
MITE
In the year following MITE, the Virginia Legislature made a signifi-
cant change in the Virginia Act:78 Virginia rescinded a provision that
had been held to violate the Commerce Clause in Telvest, Inc. v. Brad-
shaw.79 The unconstitutional provision forced offerors who bought on
the open market and who intended to change the control of the target
company to disclose information similar to that required in a formal
tender offer.80
76. See infra text accompanying note 102.
77. See supra note 65.
78. See VA. CODE § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (1984).
79. 547 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1982), affid, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983). See also supra
note 54.
In addition to this change, the Virginia Legislature amended the Act to prohibit certain
takeover bids. If the offeror had purchased more than two percent of the outstanding shares of
a company within the prior two years, it was prohibited from making a tender offer for less
than all of the outstanding shares of that company. VA. CODE § 13.1-530(a)(i) (1984).
80. As originally written, the provision exempted certain offers from the Act's disclosure
requirements. The italicized portion of the provision reprinted below was held unconstitu-
tional in Telvest and repealed by amendment:
An offer to purchase shares to be effected by a registered broker-dealer on a stock
exchange or in the over-the-counter market if the broker performs only the custom-
ary broker's function, and receives no more than the customary broker's commis-
sions, and neither the principal nor the broker solicits or arranges for the solicitation
of orders to sell shares of the offeree company; provided, however, that this exemption
shall not apply to any such offer made by a person who intends to change the control of
the offeree company unless such person shall have filed with the Commission and with
the registered agent of the offeree company a statement setting forth the purpose of
such change, the method of carrying out such intention and such other information as
the Commission may require as necessary in the public interest or for the protection of
investors; and any person who, at the time he makes such offer, owns in excess often
per centum of any class of the equity securities of the offeree company and has
purchased more than one per centum of such class during the twelve-month period
preceding such offer shall be presumed to have such intention unless the Commission
determines otherwise ....
VA. CODE § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (1984).
The unconstitutional proviso had been designed to regulate "creeping" tender offers. See
infra note 83.
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Utilizing the MITE Commerce Clause analysis, the District Court
found that this particular section of the Virginia Act had just as great an
application to out-of-state transactions as did the invalid Illinois Act.8"
In addition, removing a major purchaser from the market because of fail-
ure to qualify for the exemption disrupted the stock price and deprived
shareholders of the opportunity to sell to a willing buyer.
8 2
Virginia's interest in protecting resident shareholders from the al-
leged unfairness of unregulated "creeping" tender offers83 was balanced
against these burdens on interstate commerce. But because the proviso
did not protect Virginia shareholders exclusively, and the burdens on in-
terstate commerce were substantial, the burdens were "excessive in rela-
tion to the local benefits."
'84
Beside the challenge in Telvest, no other attack has been levied
against the Virginia Act since MITE. Essentially, the Act remains in its
original form. Most notably, the hearing provisions remain virtually
unchanged.
85
An evaluation of the Virginia Act in light of Edgar v. MITE must
focus on the Pike test, since it was the basis for the MITE majority opin-
ion. The local interests served by the Virginia Act are similar to those
asserted by Illinois in MITE: protection of resident shareholders and
regulation of the internal affairs of Virginia corporations.86
81. The Virginia provision
purports to cover open market purchases, wherever made, even if the transaction
crosses state lines or takes place entirely outside Virginia, and even if neither party to
the transaction has any ties to Virginia other than owning stock in a company that is
incorporated in Virginia and does business in Virginia.
547 F. Supp. at 797. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 % 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
82. 547 F. Supp. at 797.
83. A "creeping" tender offer has been defined as
an acquisition strategy where, by achieving a substantial position in a company
through open market purchases, an acquiring company can achieve a blocking posi-
tion which enables them to purchase the remaining shares by tender or exchange
offer at a cost that would be sbstantially less than if a formal tender offer had been
made earlier.
547 F. Supp. at 798 (citing post-trial brief of the State of Virginia, at 15).
84. For discussion of this test, see supra notes 48, 65 and accompanying text.
In affirming, the court of appeals noted that the Williams Act accords investors similar
protections against so-called creeping tender offers, since it requires disclosure when an open
market purchaser acquires five percent of an equity security. The Virginia proviso was not
triggered until a purchaser had acquired ten percent of an equity security. Compare 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (1983) with VA. CoDE § 13.1-529(b)(iil) (1980).
85. Use of the standard federal form, Schedule 14-D, is now acceptable in lieu of the
disclosure required under § 13.1-531(b). VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a) (1984). However, the SCC
retains authority to require additional disclosure beyond a Schedule 14-D if it is "in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Id. § 13.1-531(bl).
86. In general, these two interests are considered the primary justifications for state take-
over legislation. See, ag., AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 940-51 (S.D. Ohio
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The major difference between the two statutes is Virginia's regula-
tion of the internal affairs of its corporations. The Virginia Act applies
only to corporations incorporated under Virginia law and doing at least
some business in Virginia.87 The Illinois Act could apply to non-Illinois
corporations that conducted business in other states if at least ten percent
of the corporation's shareholders were Illinois residents.88 The Court
considered this provision a major fault in the Illinois law. Because the
Virginia Act is limited to Virginia corporations doing some business in
Virginia, it avoids this infirmity. Therefore, defending Virginia's Act on
the ground that it only regulates the internal affairs of Virginia corpora-
tions has more validity than the similar assertion by Illinois in MITE.
Nevertheless, the MITE Court warned that since "[t]ender offers con-
template transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party. . . [they] do
not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company."89
This caveat suggests that the Court would give no weight to a local inter-
est in "regulating internal affairs" if this issue were raised again. 90
The other local interest, protection of resident shareholders, would
be the primary justification for the Virginia Act if it were faced with a
constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause. It has been argued
that the extra time afforded by state takeover statutes is necessary to en-
able resident investors "to reach an informed decision on the basis of
complete and accurate information."9 1 But as the MITE Court noted, a
state "has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident sharehold-
ers."' 92 While the hearing provisions of the Virginia Act purportedly pro-
tect resident shareholders, they nonetheless affect all nonresident
shareholders of Virginia corporations. When a hearing is ordered by the
Virginia SCC to examine a tender offer, the offer is stayed until the SCC
adjudicates the proposed disclosure. 93 Given the time limitations in the
Virginia Act's hearing provisions, tender offers could be stayed nation-
1979); Langevoort, supra note 5, at 220-23, 242; Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58
MARQ. L. REv. 687, 690 (1975).
Other state interests have been identified, but courts have not seriously considered them.
See, eg., Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1282 (5th Cir. 1978) (interest in preserving the contribution
made by local companies to the quality of life in the communities in which they exist). Cf
Boehm, supra note 5, at 742-46 (urging recognition of states' economic and regulatory interest
in preventing departure of corporate plants and facilities).
87. VA. CODE § 13.1-529(e) (1984). See supra text accompanying note 28.
88. 457 U.S. at 645. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
89. 457 U.S. at 645.
90. This statement by Justice White has been criticized as ignoring "the reality of a state's
interest in a corporation that is physically present within it." Profusek & Gompf, supra note
66, at 19.
91. Note, supra note 6, at 513.
92. 457 U.S. at 644.
93. VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)(ii) (1984).
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wide for forty-five days longer than under the Williams Act.94
Thus, the potential delay caused by the lengthy hearings creates an
undue burden upon interstate commerce.9" As the Court noted in
MITE, delay is "the most potent weapon in a tender offer fight."19 6  De-
lay accords the target's incumbent management more time to invoke a
panoply of defensive measures. These tactics include the repurchase of
the target's stock to raise the market price and make it more expensive
for the offeror; issuing new stock to dilute the offeror's position; issuing a
"poison pill"97 ; utilizing a "scorched-earth" defense 8 ; or implementing a
"Pac Man" defense.991°°
The delay also affects the market price of the stock. Uncertainty
surrounding a stymied tender offer increases the chance for irregular
price fluctuations and suspended trading on the national exchanges. 101
As the Supreme Court noted in MITE:
94. Id. § 13.1-534(b). Actually, in such a scenario the offer would be public for 65 days
because of the 20 day pre-offer filing requirement in § 13.1-531(a). Not only would the market
react to the pre-filing, but target management could begin formulating defensive tactics 20
days before the offer even begins.
95. See, e.g., Wilner & Landy, supra note 5, at 22. Recently, this issue was addressed by
the Sixth Circuit in Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982):
We find that to the extent that the [Michigan] state statutes confer power on state
authorities to interfere with the timing of an interstate tender offer made under the
Williams Act, or to compel revision of the solicitation or tender offer as a condition
of proceeding, they impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
Id. at 565.
96. 457 U.S. at 637 n.12 (citing Langevoort, supra note 5, at 238).
97. A "poison pill" is a class of securities convertable upon consummation of any merger
or similar transaction into the common stock of the acquiring company. SEC ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 140-41 (July 8, 1983).
98. The "scorched-earth defense" consists of the target selling its assets or by other means
destroying the character of the company. Id.
99. A "Pac Man" defense is a tender offer by the target for the securities of the offeror.
Id.
100. Some of these more common measures, colloquially referred to as "shark repellants,"
are "fair price" and "super majority" provisions invoked by amendment to a target's articles of
incorporation or by-laws. A fair price provision alleviates the danger presented by a "two-
tiered" tender offer. In this type of offer, the offeror bids a premium price- usually well above
the market price-until a controlling block of stock is obtained. Once in control, the offeror
bids a greatly reduced price for the remaining shares. See Comment, The Front-End Loaded,
Two-Tiered Tender Offer, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 811, 812 (1983). Fair price provisions require
the offeror to pay equivalent consideration for both the control shares and the remaining
shares. Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: Defending Self-Help for Takeover
Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 699, 717-20 (1979).
"Super majority" provisions require more than a simple majority vote-usually 67%-to
approve mergers or other actions collateral to takeovers (eg., amending by-laws or charters;
changing board size or tenures of office). See Black & Smith, supra, at 713-16; Note, Corporate
Battles for Control, supra note 5, at 1481 n.320 (citing Arieff, Drafting of 'Shark Repellants'
Receives Increased Attention, Legal Times, Feb. 21, 1983, at 1, col. 1).
101. Wilner & Landy, supra note 5, at 11. See also SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 1, at
A-12 (June 4, 1969).
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The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a
nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived
of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The realloca-
tion of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process
which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The
incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent manage-
ment to perform well so that stock prices remain high is
reduced.10'
This analysis demonstrates that the Virginia Act, like the Illinois
Act, burdens interstate commerce. Therefore, the only way the Act can
pass constitutional muster under MITE and the Pike test is if this burden
is not excessive in relation to the admittedly legitimate local benefit of
"shareholder protection."103 Analyzing a similar provision in the Illinois
Act, the MITE Court concluded summarily that the Williams Act pro-
vides the same substantive protections as the state act and that any addi-
tional protection that the state act provided was "speculative."" 4
Because investors were already protected by federal law under the Wil-
liams Act, the local benefit derived from the state act was minimal when
compared with the burdens it imposed on interstate commerce.
10 5
This reasoning, while perhaps "too simplistic, ' 10 6 nevertheless ap-
plies to the Virginia Act. The Supreme Court has stated that the Wil-
liams Act provides sufficient safeguards to enable investors to evaluate
tender offers. States may not justify unduly burdensome tender offer reg-
ulation on the ground that federal law is inadequate to protect local
shareholders; statutes like Virginia's Take-Over-Bid Disclosure Act will
fail the MITE test.
Conclusion
Virginia's Act purports to protect resident shareholders of Virginia
corporations from dangers inherent in the tender offer process. The law,
however, affects non-Virginia investors throughout the nation.10 7 This
102. 457 U.S. at 643 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rav. 1161, 1173-74 (1981); Fischel, Effi-
cient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. Rav. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 12 (1976)).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 65-67. As outlined earlier, the disclosure re-
quired by the Virginia Act is nearly identical to that required by the Williams Act. See supra
text accompanying note 32. In fact, an offeror can even substitute a federal Schedule 14-D for
the information required by Virginia. See supra note 85. Thus, to use the language of the
MITE Court, the "extra" protection afforded local investors by Virginia disclosure require-
ments is speculative at best. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645.
104. 457 U.S. at 644-45. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
105. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; see also supra notes 65, 69 and accompanying text.
106. Profusek & Gompf, supra note 66, at 18 (footnotes omitted). See also supra text ac-
companying notes 74-77.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
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effect translates into a burden on interstate commerce.108 The burden
might be acceptable if balanced by strong local interests. But the Vir-
ginia Act, like the Illinois Act in MITE, fails to offset this burden.
According to the MITE rationale, the Virginia Act does not benefit
resident shareholders with greater substantive protection than the Wl-
liams Act. Both acts require basically the same disclosure, 109 and the
hearing provisions afford only speculative extra investor protection."'
When weighed against the drastic potential for disrupting legitimate na-
tionwide tender offers," 1 the burden of the hearing provisions is exces-
sive in relation to any possible local benefit. As Justice White astutely
pointed out, the only group that the hearing provisions really benefit is
the incumbent management of the target corporation.
1 2
Critical to the MITE Court was its belief that the increased risk that
the tender offer would fail due to incumbent management's defensive tac-
tics outweighed the possible benefits of delay inherent in Illinois' hearing
provisions. Because the hearing provisions in the Virginia Act could cre-
ate excessive delay, it should share the same fate as the Illinois Act; its
putative local benefits are minimal when compared with its interference
with interstate commerce.
108. Id.
109. See supra note 103.
110. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
112. See supra note 68.
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